

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 137366
ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-07 DHA-02 SS-15 SIG-01 CIAE-00
PM-04 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 DODE-00 /067 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:JGHUFF
APPROVED BY EUR:RDVINE
ACDA:RSTRAND
C:RHOPPER
D/HA:CBRODY
EUR/CE:DANDERSON
EUR/RPE:DSWARTZ
EUR/RPM:JJMARESCA

-----141837Z 065668 /43

R 141651Z JUN 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 137366

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, NATO, FRG

SUBJECT: US/FRG CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE - MAY 27, 1977

1. ANDREAS MEYER-LANDRUT, DIRECTOR FOR SOVIET, EAST
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 137366

EUROPEAN, AND CSCE AFFAIRS IN THE WEST GERMAN FOREIGN
OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS DEPUTY GUENTHER JOETZE, VISITED
WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE AND OTHER MATTERS
MAY 26 AND 27, 1977. CSCE DISCUSSIONS WERE LED, ON US SIDE,
BY AMBASSADOR ALBERT W. SHERER, HEAD OF DELEGATION TO THE
BELGRADE PREPARATORY MEETING. DURING THE COURSE OF HIS
WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, MEYER-LANDRUT MET WITH COUNSELOR
NIMETZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMITAGE, DR. SHULMAN,
ROBERT HUNTER (NSC), AND MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL CSCE
COMMISSION. THE FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF US/FRG CON-

SULTATIONS ON CSCE DURING MEYER-LANDRUT'S VISIT. A MEMCON OF THE NIMETZ/MEYER-LANDRUT DISCUSSION ON CSCE IS BEING POUCHED TO EMBASSY BONN.

2. SOVIET POLITICAL CONCEPT. BOTH SIDES NOTED THE DANGER OF AGREEING AT THE JUNE MEETING TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A "POLITICAL CONCEPT" FOR THE MAIN MEETING. MEYER-LANDRUT STATED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION SHOULD BE THAT THE PREPARATORY MEETING SHOULD DEAL ONLY WITH PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. THE ALLIES SHOULD RAISE A POINT OF ORDER IF

NECESSARY TO BLOCK SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING AND, IN PARTICULAR, SHOULD USE THIS TACTIC IN COUNTERING SOVIET PROPOSAL CONCERNING POLITICAL CONCEPT. THE US SIDE STATED THAT OTHER TACTICS MIGHT ALSO BE USED IN TURNING DISCUSSION AWAY FROM SOVIET POLITICAL CONCEPT. THE US FELT IT WOULD ALSO BE EFFECTIVE TO INTRODUCE A PAPER ON PROCEDURES AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING, WHICH WOULD EMPHASIZE NEED TO DISCUSS DATE, DURATION, AGENDA, AND OTHER MODALITIES, RATHER THAN POLITICAL "CONCEPTS." THE US SIDE SUGGESTED THAT THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN SUPPORTING A WESTERN PAPER AND COUNTERING THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL CONCEPT. MEYER-LANDRUT NOTED THAT THE NEUTRALS HAVE BEEN PASSED A COPY OF THE DRAFT PAPER ON PROCEDURES AGREED TO BY THE EC-9. CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 137366

BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN INTRODUCTION OF THE PROCEDURAL PAPER AND LATER USE OF POINTS OF ORDER TO COUNTER SOVIET TACTICS.

3. TARGET DATE. MEYER-LANDRUT OUTLINED THE FRG POSITION IN FAVOR OF ALLIED AGREEMENT ON A TARGET DATE FOR THE MAIN MEETING. THE GERMANS, IN PARTICULAR, DESIRE TO AVOID "DRAGGING OUT" THE MAIN MEETING AND, CONSEQUENTLY, PUBLIC DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE BELGRADE FOLLOW-UP PROCESSES. THE US SIDE AGREED IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL TO DRAG OUT THE MEETING, BUT FELT THAT AGREEMENT ON TERMINAL DATE COULD PREJUDICE BELGRADE WORK. US FAVORED AGREEMENT TO ADJOURN BY CONSENSUS ONLY AFTER ALL WORK COMPLETED AND FINAL DOCUMENT AGREED, AND STATED THAT AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE ON THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN WORKED OUT AT NATO.

4. NEW PROPOSALS. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS TABLED AT BELGRADE SHOULD BE LIMITED. THEY NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE IT WAS EASY FOR NATO TO LIMIT ITS NEW PROPOSALS, THE WEST HAD NO CONTROL OVER NEUTRAL, NON-ALIGNED, AND EASTERN ACTIONS. THE US STRESSED THE NEED TO SPECIFY AND PRIORITIZE ALLIED NEW PROPOSALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEYER-LANDRUT ALSO NOTED THE NEED

TO EDUCATE THE PUBLIC SINCE THE PUBLIC MAY BE EXPECTING A LARGE NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE--AND THAT THIS COULD DILUTE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. MEYER-LANDRUT STATED THAT AT THE EC-9 DISCUSSIONS RECENTLY IN LONDON, SOME EC-9 NEW PROPOSALS HAD BEEN ELIMINATED AND THAT AT ITS JUNE MEETING THE EC-9 WILL DECIDE ON A PRIORITY ORDER FOR NEW PROPOSALS. MEYER-LANDRUT ALSO STATED THAT THE WEST GERMANS FAVORED COINING A NEW PHRASE FOR NEW PROPOSALS SO AS TO AVOID THE POSSIBLE EASTERN ACCUSATION OF CHANGING OR REDRAFTING THE FINAL ACT.

THE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT NEW PROPOSALS MIGHT BE REFERRED
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 137366

TO AS "POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED" OR "SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION." REGARDING PROCEDURE, MEYER-LANDRUT FELT THAT NEW PROPOSALS SHOULD SOMEHOW EMANATE FROM INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY PRESENTATIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION. THE US SIDE STATED THAT IT HOPES THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW WOULD NOT BECOME SO MIXED WITH NEW PROPOSALS SO AS TO BECOME OBSCURED BY THEM. MEYER-LANDRUT FELT, TO THE CONTRARY, THAT A WELL CONSTRUCTED PRESENTATION ON NEW PROPOSALS WOULD NOT DETRACT FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW BUT IN FACT WOULD COMPLEMENT IT.

5. NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES. THE FRG SIDE REVIEWED THE INCREASED INTEREST IN NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND NOTED THE REFERENCES IN THE LONDON SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE. MEYER-LANDRUT NOTED THAT THE USSR HAS BEEN LARGELY SUCCESSFUL IN MAKING NORTH/SOUTH QUESTIONS APPEAR AS ANEAST/WEST PROBLEM AND AS A "FORMER COLONIALIST VERSUS THIRD WORLD/SOCIALIST CONFRONTATION." THERE WAS A NEED TO CHALLENGE THIS VIEW AT BELGRADE. SINCE IT IS CERTAIN ;OMANIA AND POSSIBLY YUGOSLAVIA WILL INTRODUCE NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES AT BELGRADE, THE WEST SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE AND TO COUNTER STANDARD SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS. MEYER-LANDRUT CITED A VERY CANDID SPEECH MADE BY EGON BAHR, FORMER FRG MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, IN MOSCOW TO IMEMO IN WHICH HE STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE SOVIETS FOR THEIR NEGATIVE POSITION ON DEVELOPMENTAL AID TO THE THIRD WORLD. MEYER-LANDRUT OFFERED BAHR'S PRESENTATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF POLITICAL GESTURE THE WEST SHOULD MAKE ON THIS ISSUE AT BELGRADE. HE STRESSED THAT THE GERMAN IDEA IS NOT TO BRING THE SPECIFICS OF CIEC-TYPE ISSUES INTO BELGRADE BUT RATHER TO ADOPT A POLITICAL STANCE URGING THE EASTERN STATES TO OFFER GREATER DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE TO THE THIRD WORLD. THE US SIDE EXPRESSED SOME RESERVATION REGARDING THE FRG POSITION ON NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES. IN PARTICULAR, THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 137366

US FELT THAT PROLONGED DISCUSSION OF SUCH ISSUES IN BELGRADE COULD DETRACT FROM THE MAJOR PURPOSE OF THE MEETING--A SERIOUS REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. THE US SIDE AGREED TO STUDY THE GERMAN POSITION ON NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES FURTHER AND ACCEPTED A COPY OF THE BAHR SPEECH IN MOSCOW FOR FURTHER READING.

6. CBM'S. THE US SIDE REVIEWED US POLICY ON CBMS AT BELGRADE AND NOTED IN CONFIDENCE THAT THE US WAS REVIEWING ITS POSITION ON A POSSIBLE CBM ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS. THE US SIDE STATED THAT IT WANTED TO LET THE FRG KNOW OF THIS STATE-OF-PLAY, EVEN THOUGH A FORMAL USG

POSITION HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN. MEYER-LANDRUT STATED THAT DISCUSSION OF CBMS AT BELGRADE WOULD BE TO THE WEST'S ADVANTAGE FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS:

A) OFFERS POSSIBILITY OF CONCENTRATING THE DISCUSSION OF MILITARY AND DISARMAMENT SUBJECTS ON CONCRETE MEASURES;

B) OFFERS POSSIBILITY OF CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES;

C) OFFERS POSSIBILITY OF PRESSING FOR MORE COMPLETE CBM IMPLEMENTATION;

D) CSCE-CBMS REPRESENT THE FIRST CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ACHIEVED IN THE SECURITY AREA IN EUROPE;

E) CSCE PROVIDES A USEFUL FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY QUESTIONS WHICH IS BROADER THAN THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY MBFR.

MEYER-LANDRUT NOTED THAT SOME STATES AT BELGRADE WOULD BE LIKELY TO SUPPORT ESTABLISHING A CBM WORKING GROUP AFTER BELGRADE AND THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD STRONGLY RESIST THIS CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 137366

INITIATIVE. WHILE THE FRG DOES NOT ADVOCATE A POST-BELGRADE CBM WORKING GROUP' DISCUSSION OF THIS AT BELGRADE COULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE MORE DEEPLY CBM ISSUES OF INTEREST SUCH AS A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OBSERVERS, A MOVEMENTS CBM AND STRENGTHENED SMALLER MANEUVERS CBM. MEYER-LANDRUT FELT, HOWEVER, THAT DISCUSSION OF THIS POSSIBILITY AT BELGRADE COULD AID THE WEST IN FURTHERING SOME OF ITS OTHER AIMS IN THE CBM AREA. MEYER-LANDRUT ENDED BY THANKING THE US FOR INFORMING HIM OF THE STATUS OF US CONSIDERATION OF A MILITARY MOVEMENTS CBM AND RECALLED THAT ANY CBM IN THIS AREA WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORDED. WE INDICATED THAT WE WERE ANALYZING

SPECIFIC POSSIBILITIES TO SEE IF WE COULD IDENTIFY SOME WHICH COULD MEET US AND NATO REQUIREMENTS.

7. HUMAN RIGHTS. THE US SIDE STATED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER AT THE LONDON SUMMIT AND SECRETARY VANCE'S SPEECH IN ATLANTA IN EARLY MAY GAVE THE DEFINITIVE US POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE US NOTED THAT WE DESIRED NO CONFRONTATION WITH THE EASTERN STATES IN BELGRADE ON HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE A HIGHLY POLEMICAL EXCHANGE COULD BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. MEYER-LANDRUT NOTED THAT TACTICS AND PROCEDURE WERE QUITE IMPORTANT ON THIS ISSUE AND STRESSED THE NEED NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH COULD

HAMPER FRG BILATERAL EFFORTS REGARDING THE PLIGHT OF ETHNIC GERMANS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE FELT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AND INDEED NECESSARY TO MENTION HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE OPENING PLENARY STATEMENTS, MOST LIKELY IN A GENERAL WAY. HE ALSO FELT THAT IN CLOSED PLENARY AND CLOSED COMMITTEE SESSIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES COULD BE DEALT WITH IN GREATER DETAIL. HOWEVER, MEYER-LANDRUT NOTED THE NEED TO INFORM PUBLICS OF ALLIED ACTIONS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE EVEN IF THESE TOOK PLACE IN CLOSED SESSIONS. HE STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A LIVELY DEBATE THE PREVIOUS WEEK
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 137366

IN BUNDESTAG IN WHICH THE CDU DEMANDED THAT THE FRG PRESENT A SPECIFICALLY WORDED DOCUMENT ON EASTERN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AT BELGRADE AND THAT THIS PAPER WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE NATO ALLIES. THE SPD FAVORED AND WAS EVENTUALLY SUCCESSFUL IN PROPOSING A MORE GENERALLY WORDED DOCUMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT PLEDGED TO DISCUSS WITH THE ALLIES BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO TABLE IN BELGRADE. MEYER-LANDRUT STATED THAT HE WOULD ASK THE FRG MISSION AT NATO TO SUPPLY THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF WITH THIS DOCUMENT.

CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING AGENDA, VISITS, PLANNING MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 14-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE137366
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/RPM:JGHUFF
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770212-0422
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197706110/baaaewes.tel
Line Count: 260
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a9229e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2014059
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US/FRG CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE - MAY 27, 1977
TAGS: OTRA, PFOR, GE, US, CSCE, NATO, (MEYER-LANDRUT, ANDREAS)
To: BONN INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a9229e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009